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Nucleic Acid Testing
The risk of transfusion-transmitted viral infections is
primarily due to the failure of serologic screening tests to
detect recently infected donors in the preseroconversion
“window” phase of infection. To reduce this window period,
European Union regulators began to require in 1999 that all
plasma be tested by nucleic acid testing (NAT) techniques for
hepatitis C virus (HCV) if derivatives made from such plasma
were to be sold in Europe. This announcement was a major
impetus for developing and implementing NAT of blood and
plasma from donors in the United States and other
developed countries.
Virtually all whole blood and plasma donations collected
in the United States are being screened for both HCV and
HIV-1 by NAT. The testing is being done as a part of
investigational new drug applications approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration. Due to the complex and labor-
intensive nature of the testing, it is being implemented by
using a pooled strategy-–namely, donations are being tested
in pools of 16 to 24. At this nascent stage, NAT can require
several days more to complete than conventional serologic
tests. Certain components, particularly platelets because
they become outdated in 5 days, are being released by some
blood centers before NAT has been completed and on the basis
of serologic testing alone.
The pooled NAT procedure is expected to reduce the
preantibody seroconversion window period from the current
22 days to about 12 days for HIV and from 70 days to 10 to 14
days for HCV. Organisms are potentially detectable only
during a portion of the pre-NAT window period, even when
using single donor NAT. It is this portion of the window period
when donations are thought to be viremic (i.e., infectious) that
is critical to transfusion safety.
Testing of whole blood donations in the United States
from April 1999 through March 2000 revealed 42 NAT-
positive/HCV antibody-negative donations (of 1.04 x 107
tested) and 4 NAT-positive/HIV-1 antibody-negative/HIV-1
p24 antigen-negative donations (of 0.76 x 107 tested). The rate
of HCV-infected donations positive by only NAT was 40.3
(approximately 1 in 250,000) and HIV-infected was 5.2
(approximately 1 in 2,000,000) per 10 million donations.  These
testing advances, however, are associated with substantial
costs: the mini-pool NAT procedure has been estimated to cost
$1.2 million dollars per quality-adjusted life year.
As the technology evolves, NAT testing of all blood
components will be completed prior to transfusion. The
ultimate goal is to progress from mini-pool testing to single
donor testing, but this change appears to be several years
away. Future applications of NAT technology may include
expanding testing platforms to enable direct detection of
additional viruses (e.g., hepatitis B virus, parvovirus B-19,
and cytomegalovirus) and other infectious agents (e.g.
Trypanosoma, Babesia, and Plasmodium species).
Novel Hepatitis Agents
Although important advances have been made in our
understanding of transfusion-transmitted hepatitis over the
last several decades, some persons with acute posttransfusion
hepatitis test negative for all known hepatitis agents. This
observation has fueled concerns about the existence of one or
more as-yet-unidentified hepatitis viruses that can be
transmitted by blood transfusion. Through advances in
molecular virology several “candidate” viruses have been
identified as the cause of non-A-E hepatitis.
TT virus (TTV), named for the patient from whom it was
first isolated in Japan, is a novel, single-stranded, circular
DNA virus. Although TTV can be transmitted by transfusion,
similar rates of infection have been observed among blood
recipients tested posttransfusion who did and did not develop
transfusion-associated hepatitis. TTV can result in persistent
infection; however, studies to date have not shown an
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Improvements in donor screening and testing and viral inactivation of plasma derivatives together have
resulted in substantial declines in transfusion-transmitted infections over the last two decades. Most
recently, nucleic acid testing techniques have been developed to screen blood and plasma donations for
evidence of very recent viral infections that could be missed by conventional serologic tests.  Nonetheless,
the blood supply remains vulnerable to new and reemerging infections.  In recent years, numerous infectious
agents found worldwide have been identified as potential threats to the blood supply.  Several newly
discovered hepatitis viruses and agents of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies present unique
challenges in assessing possible risks they may pose to the safety of blood and plasma products.Conference Panel Summaries
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associated pathologic condition, and no current evidence
suggests that TTV is an agent of hepatitis in humans.
Recently, much attention has been focused on a diverse
family of viruses called SEN-V that were isolated by using
degenerate primers from TTV. To date, preliminary, limited
studies have found that approximately 2% of current and pre-
1990 blood donors test positive for SEN-V. Testing of archived
serum samples at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
showed that the proportion of cardiac surgery patients with
evidence of new infection with SEN-V was 10 times higher
among those who had received blood transfusions (30%) than
among those who had not (3%). Further, a SEN-V-positive
donor could be identified for about 70% of SEN-V-positive
recipients. Although these data clearly indicate that SEN-V is
transmitted by transfusion, many important questions
remain unanswered; for example, is SEN-V the long-
anticipated primary agent of non-A-E hepatitis? The NIH
study found new SEN-V infections in 11 of 12 patients (92%)
with non-A-E hepatitis and 60 of 252 patients (24%) who did
not develop hepatitis (p<0.001). In addition, the level of
viremia generally paralleled the alanine aminotransferase
level. These data suggest, but do not prove, a causal
association with transfusion-transmitted non A-E hepatitis.
Early evidence suggests that SEN-V can replicate in the liver,
but there are no data to show that it is a cause of fulminant
liver failure, and its role in cirrhosis and chronic cryptogenic
hepatitis is uncertain.
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a human transmissi-
ble spongiform encephalopathy believed to be caused by an
unconventional agent—a prion protein—which is an altered
form of a normal protein found in many tissues of the body.
Most cases of CJD are classified as sporadic, since they are
thought to result from spontaneous generation of the
abnormal prion protein, which then continues to replicate and
accumulate in the brain. Between 10% and 15% of persons
with CJD have familial disease, caused by one of more than 20
known mutations. A small number (250) of iatrogenic cases of
CJD have occurred in persons who received contaminated
pituitary growth hormone, corneas, or dura mater from
human cadavers or who were operated on with contaminated
neurosurgical instruments.
Concerns regarding the transmissibility of the agent of
CJD by blood are supported primarily by laboratory and
experimental studies. These studies have demonstrated that
rodents with several experimental transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSE) have small amounts of infectivity in
blood during both the asymptomatic incubation period and
clinically overt disease. Transfusion transmission of an
experimental TSE in hamsters has been demonstrated, albeit
rarely, when known infected blood was administered
intravenously.
Despite the findings that suggest a potential for
bloodborne transmission of CJD, accumulating epidemiologic
data support the view that such a risk, if it exists at all,
remains theoretical. First, there are no confirmed reports of
CJD transmission by blood or blood products, despite
intensive efforts to identify such cases. Second, five case-
control studies involving nearly 2,500 patients have not shown
blood transfusions to be a risk factor for CJD. Third, CJD has
not been detected in recipients of blood from donors who
developed CJD months to years after donating blood and were
presumably incubating CJD at the time of donation. Finally,
active surveillance was conducted among an estimated 12,000
hemophilia patients in hemophilia treatment centers in the
United States since 1995, plus additional centers in other
countries, and no cases of CJD have been found among them.
In 1996, a new variant of CJD (nvCJD) was first
recognized in the United Kingdom. The cause of this new
human transmissible spongiform encephalopathy appears to
be the same agent responsible for an outbreak of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) among cattle in the United
Kingdom. The BSE epizootic is thought to have resulted from
inclusion of carcasses of sheep infected with scrapie in the
meat and bone meal fed to cattle in the early 1980s. Features
of nvCJD are distinctly different from those of sporadic CJD;
for example, patients infected with nvCJD are younger and
have prominent early psychiatric and behavioral manifesta-
tions, and nvCJD has a distinctive neuropathology. As of July
2000, public health officials had reported 75 cases of
confirmed or probable nvCJD in the United Kingdom; 2 cases
were found in France and 1 in Ireland.
No cases of transmission of nvCJD by blood transfusion
have been reported; nonetheless, because its agent is newly
discovered, its degree of infectiousness is unknown.  Further,
important differences have been noted between sporadic CJD
and nvCJD, and it is therefore impossible to extrapolate about
nvCJD based on what is known about sporadic CJD. For
example, the abnormal prion protein is detectable in tissues
taken from spleens and tonsils of patients with nvCJD but not
in those taken from patients with sporadic CJD. In view of
this uncertainty, U.K. health officials have taken several
precautions, which include retrieving all blood and blood
products made with blood or plasma obtained from donors
subsequently identified with nvCJD, importing all plasma
used to produce plasma-derived products, and implementing
leukofiltration of all blood donations. Persons who resided in
or traveled to the United Kingdom for a total of 6 months or
more between 1980 and 1996 are not permitted to donate
blood and plasma in the United States.
Conclusion
The high safety level of the blood supply is the result of
continued refinements and improvements in donor screening
and testing. Continued vigilance is critical to protect the blood
supply from known pathogens and to detect the emergence of
new infectious agents. As potential new threats are
discovered, the need for both the safety of the blood supply and
the availability of lifesaving blood and blood products must be
balanced. Finally, because the margin of benefit is likely to be
very small in some cases, especially when the risk of
transmitting some infectious agents via transfusion is very
low, policymakers may need to consider economic factors as
well as health factors when making decisions involving the
blood supply.